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The concept of liminality favors a broad interpretation, lending itself easily to disciplinary 
contexts outside of the original framework of cultural anthropology. Developed by Arnold van 
Gennep (1960) and Victor Turner (1969) while exploring rites of passage, liminality points to in-
between situations and conditions where established structures are dislocated, hierarchies 
reversed, and traditional settings of authority possibly endangered. The liminal state is a central 
phase in all social and cultural transitions. It marks the passage of the subject through Òa cultural 
realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming stateÓ and is thus a realm of 
great ambiguity, since the Òliminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and 
between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonialÓ (Turner 
1969: 80Ð81). Yet, as a threshold situation, liminality is also a vital moment of creativity, a 
potential platform for renewing the societal makeup. 
There is substantial, yet unrecognized, potential for the application of liminality across a 
range of International Relations (IR) problems, from the study of the preeminent IR conceptsÑ
power, security, sovereigntyÑto the analysis of the agent-structure relationship, state formation 
and recognition, war and political violence, structural transformation of the international system, 
extraordinary politics at times of transition, and the constitution of political identities. Applied to 
IR theory, liminality introduces an emancipatory research agenda, revealing the radical promise 
political anthropology holds for the study of International Relations. 
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The logic of transfer for applying the concept of liminalityÑwhether to the study of 
individual and small-scale communal human experiences or to analysis of full-scale societal 
systemsÑstems from the underlying rationale of political anthropology, which neither plays on 
the opposition between the individual subject and the state, nor separates the international from 
the domestic sphere, or the ÒpoliticalÓ from the Òsocial.Ó Instead of assuming an isolated 
Òinternational political realmÓ with a functionally defined Òlogic of anarchy,Ó as has been the rule 
in many disciplinary traditions of IR, liminality questions the very meaning of such an 
opposition. Contra the hierarchical setup of traditional levels of analysis in IR, liminality shares 
political anthropologyÕs assumption about the inherently political nature of Òman,Ó connecting it 
to the deepest, unalienable element of personhood (Szakolczai 2008b: 280). As Òbeing humanÓ 
means inseparable ties between individual subjects and political communities, liminality as a 
fundamental feature of the human condition could be legitimately applied to the analysis of 
International Relations as well.1 
Yet the application of liminality in IR has been modest at best because, as is suggested 
below, the concept of liminality goes against the grain of many traditional models of thought 
within IR theory. Liminality creates fundamental uneasiness for traditional IR theory as it 
disrupts, by definition, essentializations and foundational claims. Defying set-in categories, 
liminality disturbs the ingrained Òlevel of analysisÓ thinking in IR by emphasizing the 
fundamental ontological interconnection between the ÒhighÓ and the Òlow,Ó the ÒcenterÓ and the 
Òperiphery,Ó the domestic and the international. It questions the urge for the static crystallizations 
typical of much positivist-rationalist IR theory, highlighting instead the processual nature of all 
international life, with a particular interest in the study of social change. It entails a cyclical 
rather than progressive understanding of international politics, and a relational rather than 
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absolute conception of power. Or as Turner put it, liminality implies that Òthe high could not be 
high unless the low existed, and he who is high must experience what it is like to be lowÓ 
(Turner 1969: 83). 
Resisting binary opposition, liminality allows for extended conceptualization of a 
political subject (i.e., self-liminal-other). This has fundamental implications for the traditional 
categorization of actors (i.e., state and nonstate) in international relations generally as well as for 
the dynamics of the politics of belonging, becoming, and recognition in Europe and elsewhere. 
Based on the premise that we are unlikely to grasp the workings of the core without 
understanding what is happening at the limit,2 liminality takes an active interest in boundary 
zones and peripheries (traditionally conceived) rather than the established centers of international 
politics. Liminality respects the fundamental polyvocality of the world, instinctively resisting 
attempts to overtly unify political processes and subjects by forging them into a hierarchical 
order. As such, it also has implications for the normative agenda within IR theory. Finally, the 
concept of liminality enables IR as a discipline to seek active intellectual exchange and build 
mutually beneficial channels for knowledge transfers with postcolonial studies, cultural theory, 
international political theory, semiotics, and critical geopolitics, which have appropriated the 
related notions of hybridity, interstitiality, creolization, marginalization, and carnivalization (cf. 
Bhabha 1994; Bakhtin 1968). Liminality could become a Òbridge conceptÓ by which to deepen 
the interdisciplinary theoretical dialogue between these fields.  
Yet despite its interdisciplinary origins and the relational bent of its title, the discipline of 
IR traditionally has hardly focused on what falls between neat, clean-cut categories and 
concentrated instead on the construction of rigid formal dichotomies. This is particularly striking, 
considering that most of international politics happens precisely in between different political 
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subjects that are themselves inevitably ÒhappeningÓ as a result of multiple relational links to 
others. Apropos, betwixt and between could serve as a slogan for IR as a field of thought and 
practice between scholarly and practical knowledge in generalÑthat is, if we subscribe to the 
argument of all political concepts inhabiting a liminal space between theory and practice. It is 
inherently difficult to utterly suspend essentially political concepts from politics and distil them 
into perennial categories, though that has been the urge of IR theorizing more often than not. 
Epistemologically and methodologically, we should rather recognize the intrinsic inbetweenness 
of political categories (e.g., Òsecurity,Ó an essentially contested concept between theory and 
policy), and consequently engage the contradictions and normative implications of the contextual 
definitions of these notions (Ciută 2009). The curious absence of liminality from most theoretical 
elaborations of IR demonstrates no less curiously the limits of the contemporary political 
imagination. 
This chapter seeks to rectify the situation by building a concise case for serious 
engagement with liminality in IR theory. The argument is advanced in four sections. After taking 
stock of the general implications of engaging liminality in IR theorizing, the discussion moves to 
explicate the value added by liminality against the backdrop of similar claims raised by scholars 
writing from the critical tradition in IR. Next, it sketches out the structure-generating potential of 
liminal conditions in international politics and liminalityÕs analytical utility in studying war. The 
chapter concludes with reflections on the normative ramifications of embedding liminality 
deeper in IR theorizing. 
 
<HDA>Implications of Engaging Liminality in IR Theory 
Liminality, as applied to IR theory, has two major consequences for the traditional ontology and 
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epistemology of international politics. First, what it makes central to the investigation of the 
workings of world politics are not prefixed categories at clearly separable levels of analysis 
(state, international system/society) and their deterministic interaction, but rather their complex 
emergence, factual and discursive, via socialization into (and occasional resistance against) 
historically embedded rules and structural contexts (cf. Kurki 2008: 245Ð88; Neumann and 
Wigen 2013; Neumann 2014). Ontologically, then, global political reality is understood as 
constituted of multiple Òproducts-in-process,Ó entities neither here nor there but always 
becoming different, without any teleological implications (cf. Wight 2006: 7; Der Derian 2009: 
254). That is, liminality does not share an idea of history underlined by the belief in progress.3 
Second, having rejected attempts to objectify, reify, and temporally fix the multiple states 
of being, the inquiry should rather focus on genealogical exploration of the processes of 
becoming, and the intersocietal dimension of social change. Disregarding IRÕs intrinsic fetish of 
structure, liminality emphasizes the historical evolution of both the modern international system 
and the concepts used to describe its operation (cf. Walker 2001: 321Ð23). The stress on 
processuality, relationality, and differentiation, and the rejection of essentialization set liminality 
sharply in opposition to not only positivist/rationalist IR but also many conventional 
constructivist and Marxist approaches to the study of world politics. Liminality offers a 
fundamental critique of IRÕs conventional onto-spatial imagination and its traditional focus on 
policing the Òsensible boundariesÓ of statehood, sovereignty, international system, identity, and 
security (Vrasti 2008: 300). Instead, it reveals their contested history, recognizing the inevitable 
intertwining of logical classifications and hierarchies with social and political ones (see further 
Durkheim and Mauss 1963). 
While mainstream IR theory from classical realism to contemporary neoliberalism has 
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sought universal laws of international politics, liminality seeks to capture the particular, 
contingent, and idiosyncratic, always aiming at a sensitive grasp of the context. True, liminality 
also draws on universals (e.g., the ubiquitous rites of passage), but these are based on 
observation of human experience, not on the rationalizations of detached analysts constructing 
abstract notions of universality. Liminality is an intellectual manifestation of an attempt to 
transform the structuralist understanding of the world into a vital field of immanence where there 
is no ÒoutsideÓ (cf. Negri 2007: 109Ð15), but rather a continuous flow between different forms 
and ways of being. Intriguingly, as Giorgio Agamben reminds us, many European languages 
express the notion of the ÒoutsideÓ with a word that literally means Òat the doorÓ or Òat the 
threshold.Ó Accordingly, the outside is not another space residing beyond a determinate space, 
but rather a passage (Agamben 2005a: 67Ð68). Thus, in the light of the distinctively in-between 
quality of liminality, IRÕs standard topographical division between what is happening inside and 
what outside of the sovereign state loses its persuasive force. 
To accept liminality as a fundamental feature of political subjectivity in IR is to radically 
depart from reliance on concrete classifications, which seek to control the subject through the 
very ÒattackÓ of naming it in a particular way. All classifications, including the distinction 
between the inside and outside of the sovereign state, nurture the hope of successful management 
of a situation, as if inability to classify would signify open recognition of humansÕ fundamental 
helplessness in the face of the world (see Szasz 1970: 97Ð98). The metaphysics of modern 
security (or rather the lack thereof) demonstrates statesÕ growing inability to use the traditional 
instruments of Ònational securityÓ to neatly organize their safety and well-being into distinct 
spheres of internal and external security. It is as if the whole phenomenon of security has become 
liminalÑquite like a Mbius strip, continually on the threshold of either one state or the otherÑ
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thus eroding the traditional topology of security along with the distinction between the local, 
national, and international (Bigo 2001: 115). Unlike IR, with its penchant for seeking ontological 
safety in the certainty of timeless categories, liminality recognizes discontinuities and ruptures in 
world politics as the standard rather than exception. Understanding that liminality is a central 
fact of international political life implies concurrent recognition of our exposure to the open and 
de facto acknowledgement of the inevitable chaos of a world without lines of distinction (Edkins 
2007: 90Ð91). 
What value, then, does liminality add, considering that scholars writing from the critical 
tradition in IR have raised similar claims without making explicit use of the notion? In my 
reading, no other social scientific concept better drives home the old truth of the connection 
between how we look and what we thus see. By illuminating the flow between different states 
and forms of being, liminality helps us reimagine the ways we think about and relate to the 
international political reality. It requires us to accept disorder along with the fact that there are 
limits to what we can possibly know, for in liminality the outcome is never certain. Liminality 
allows for deeper understanding of what happens during ÒconstitutiveÓ or ÒaxialÓ moments in 
national and international politics, and enables specification of the effects of these critical 
experiences. It embraces both the spatial and the temporal dynamic of international life, and 
captures the ultimate unresolvability of the agent-structure problem in IR. Though 
poststructuralists have long argued for a relational understanding of identity and its complexity 
beyond a simple self-other dichotomy, they have yet to grasp liminalityÕs potential to explain the 
Òproblem of differenceÓ in the construction of identities and the related processes of 
securitization (cf. Hansen 2006; Rumelili 2012). 
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deserve further exploration. These include the ritual liminality of the processes of political 
transition; the suspended, or even permanent, liminality emerging from the ordeal of a prolonged 
state of political ambiguity; and the physical liminality experienced by political subjects living 
on the border. Understanding societal reactions to liminal experiences, or the ways political 
communities are shaped by liminality, permits further insights into the foregrounding of agency 
against set-in structures. Just as classical anthropological works studied liminality from both 
chronological and spatial angles, IR could equally address the possible uses of the notion as a 
temporal and a spatial category, as well as a characteristic experience accompanying 
transformative situations and transitions in international politics. These transitions can be 
sudden, as is the case with riots and revolutions, or prolonged, as in wars or states of enduring 
political instability. 
Liminality helps to illuminate and understand multiple practices of global politics, from 
the study of political dissidents, participants of social movements, refugees,4 stateless people, 
ethnic or sociopolitical minorities, and (illegal) immigrants to the analysis of states and spaces of 
exception in the contemporary juridical-political order of world politics (cf. Agamben 1998; 
Huysmans 2006). For example, it could be applied to analyze power, violence, and resistance in 
the context of the long ÒWar on Terror,Ó practices of security-political global governmentality, 
and acts of commemorative politics as expressions of temporal liminality (see, e.g., Edkins 
2003). Critical IR scholarsÕ recent burst of interest in Giorgio AgambenÕs ideas of bare life, 
sovereign power, and the state of exception as the biopolitical paradigm of contemporary 
international politics has yet to spark an imaginative leap connecting these notions to the concept 
of liminality. Just as the liminal state properÑthe state of exception, as described by AgambenÑ
is a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all previous determinations and distinctions 
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are deactivated (Agamben 2005b: 50), periods of broad-sweeping anomie and crisis in 
international relations are marked by the collapse of normal social structures. In crisis, social 
functions and roles can break down to the point where culturally conditioned behavior is 
completely overturned, and all previously relevant social relations and customs suspended and 
altered (Agamben 2005b: 65Ð66). 
In the course of a prolonged liminal experience, the liminal ordeal is likely to become 
incorporated into and reproduced in the Òpermanent structureÓ of a society. Hence the idea of 
Òperpetual liminalityÓ emerges as a condition characteristic of societies that have long lived Òon 
the limitÓ and thus proven quite unable to conclusively surpass the experience, in spite of their 
apparent entrance into the phase of societal reaggregation. This development could be most 
intriguing from the perspective of IR, as it would enable a culturally deeper and thicker analysis 
of a whole gamut of societies and states going through crisis or dissolution and collapse of a 
previous order. Recognizing the radical propensities generated by the liminal experience, and 
thus liminalityÕs potential to bring about historical change from mere discontinuity to 
revolutionary rupture, touches the crux of the notionÕs analytical utility for IR. 
Naturally, there are also clear limits to and modalities of applying the concept of 
liminality to societies writ large. First, there is the peril of determinismÑof making the 
hyperbolic claim that liminality is to be found essentially everywhere. That would be a logical 
conclusion drawn from reading Agamben, for instance, who claims the state of exception has 
become the utmost biopolitical paradigm of contemporary international politics. Accordingly, a 
condition of permanent crisis has emerged as the new normality of international political reality, 
as if liminality has turned in on itself and the threshold has consequently become the world, with 
movement back and forth constrained (see Sakwa this volume). Still, failing to distinguish 
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between modalities of liminality would totalize and trivialize the concept and thus diminish its 
analytical usefulness for IR. The acknowledgement that we live in times and a world of change, 
or the recognition of modernity as itself Òpermanently liminalÓ (Szakolczai 2000: 215Ð27), 
should be accompanied by close-up contextual analyses of liminal moments and situations of 
different degrees and types in global politics. 
Second, the limitations of stretching the notion from small-scale communities to societies 
writ large should be clearly acknowledged in each case. Unlike the Ndembu rites of transition 
that provided the context for the termÕs original anthropological usage, large-scale societal 
liminal conditions lack a clear time span, obvious entrance and exit points, and authoritative 
Òmasters of ceremoniesÓ to guide the members of the society through the liminal ordeal (Bauman 
1994: 17). Therein lies the danger of the conceptual inflation of liminality through overtly 
metaphoric usage of the term outside of its context of conception. As scholars and practitioners 
of IR, we should steer clear of simply piling up new empirical evidence from our field to extend 
the anthropological model and forgoing critical engagement with and substantive enhancement 
of the original idea of liminality. 
Yet another point of contestation, when applying liminality to full-scale societies 
undergoing dissolution or collapse of the previous order, is the actual subject who experiences 
the liminal ordeal on a wider scale. Is it just the societyÕs elites, or more or less everybodyÑor is 
it really something that can only be a post hoc determination by the analyst? Put differently, how 
should the connection between liminality and communitas (i.e., the community going through a 
liminal experience) be understood in larger political communities (see Thomassen this volume)? 
Why do some types of communitas emerging from liminal moments turn out aggressive, full of 
resentment and hatred, instead of bolstering positive solidarity among group members and 
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thereby increasing their potential for further political mobilization?5 And what if the ritual 
passages of whole-scale societies go wrong and produce effects of most undesirable kindÑas 
infamously happened with the communist regimes of the twentieth century?6 To elucidate these 
problems, the engagement with liminality still needs to be substantiated by empirical studies in 
different fields and theoretical traditions of IR. The ÒArab SpringÓ and the popular reactions to 
the debt crisis in Europe would be interesting examples to explore here. 
 
<HDA>Liminality as an ÒUnstructuredÓ Origin of Structure 
Liminality is commonly regarded as the space of new political beginnings, a potential source of 
renewal for a community, or even a platform for large-scale societal change. Social and political 
thinkers have reflected on the relationship between liminal experiences and the establishment of 
permanent structures, or the Òlasting effectsÓ of answers produced in Òextraordinary moments,Ó 
emphasizing the extent to which ÒstructureÓ and ÒorderÓ are indeed always born in liminality 
(Thomassen this volume; Szakolczai 2000; Wydra 2001). Given the constitutive potential of 
liminal experiences in the crystallization of certain ideas and practices, we should acknowledge 
that essentially new structure-like qualities emerge in liminal periods (Thomassen this volume). 
Although the playfulness of the period of liminality is inherently unstructured, it is nonetheless 
highly structuring at the same time. Liminality constitutes a formative experience for the subject, 
providing it with a new structure and a new set of rules. Once established, these rules will glide 
back to the level of the taken-for-granted. Hence the liminal phase/experience/period could, 
somewhat paradoxically in light of the essentially unstructured nature of liminality, constitute the 
origin of structure all the same (ibid.).7 It is nonetheless essential to avoid the common tendency 
to retrospectively depict social processes as something whose result was inevitably Òknown in 
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advance,Ó almost predetermined. As William Connolly (1999) reminds us, the politics of 
becoming is really quite indeterminate, as the result that this process might lead to cannot be 
known in advance. The recognition of liminalityÕs potential to create structure-like properties 
should not be mistaken for another claim of foundationalism. 
The strength of liminality as the phase of pure possibility underscores the potential of 
agency in the liminal process. Instead of seeing reality as largely ÒgivenÓÑas is still done in 
some more conventional veins of constructivism, not to mention the traditional positivist IR 
approachesÑthe recognition of liminality simultaneously means acknowledging the power of 
agency in restructuring existing realities and creating new ones. The insiders of a defined 
political community generally perceive liminal figures as both alluring and endangering because 
such figures have the power to unsettle existing certitudes, truths, and identities. Situations of 
crisis and transition also have a positive, productive aspect, as the new setting emerging from 
these transitions can be better than the old order of things. Nonetheless, the prospect of the 
possible ÒpermanentizationÓ of liminality still emanates danger because it lacks the promise of 
reintegration that would reestablish the previous order. Therefore, permanent liminality writ large 
no longer permits novelty and encourages innovation, but rather imposes formlessness and 
disorientation as a technique of governmentality. The permanent change is thus indeed effected, 
but without qualitative transformation (see Sakwa this volume). 
Hence, it is vitally important to pay close attention to how societies experiencing a large-
scale social drama deal with the liminal period, and how they attempt to bring it to a conclusion. 
Who will be in charge of the ÒroutinizationÓ of extraordinary situations? Who will become the 
ÒcarriersÓ of the new worldview that is eventually institutionalized (see Thomassen this 
volume)? These key sociological questions should be kept in mind when the notion of liminality 
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is applied to the analysis of full-scale societal complexes and their interaction. 
Standard structuralist approaches to the study of critical events tend to gloss over the 
fundamental ambiguity of liminal periods by reconstructing the eventsÕ historical path, leading 
up to the previously known outcome. Michel Dobry (this volume) has argued for the centrality of 
Òfluid conjuncturesÓ in international politics instead, emphasizing the importance of avoiding the 
illusion that the outcomes of a fundamental social experience summarize, mirror, or encompass 
the processes that produced them. Arguably, the perspective that reconstructs the logic of events 
according to their outcomes quite simply refuses to accept that the unfolding of a process can 
turn toward one outcome or another only at the margin. Following the logic that the outcome 
essentially ascribes its meaning (retroactively) to the event, this position cannot admit that Òtiny 
causesÓ can often result in Ògreat effectsÓ or may even reverse Òstructural trendsÓ (ibid.). The 
contingency of the results of such liminal processes as large-scale crises, revolutions, and wars 
thus emerges as an important shared epistemological assumption behind the concept of liminality 
and poststructuralist approaches to the study of international relations. Again, liminality 
recognizes the freedom of agency: it emphasizes the plasticity of ÒstructuresÓ and their 
sensitivity to mobilizations and actorsÕ tactics and moves. Drawing a beautiful analogy to matter, 
which can be found as solid, gas, or liquid, Dobry (this volume) calls attention to the fact that 
social ÒstructuresÓ (or institutions and social relations more generally) need not necessarily be 
more ÒsolidÓ and ÒstableÓ than matter. Rather, despite their occasional ÒobjectificationÓ and 
institutionalization, social structures and relations can equally experience transformations of their 
states and therefore effectively experience different states. In light of these elaborations, it is 
difficult not to agree with Arpd Szakolczai (2000: 218), who declares the concept of liminality 
to be Òpotentially one of the most general and useful terms of social science,Ó comparable to IR 
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staples like structure and order. 
 
<HDA>War as a Liminal Situation sui generis 
War is one of the generative diseases of world politics that the notion of liminality helps us 
understand. All wars are essentially liminal experiences, moments of radical contingency and 
uncertainty accompanying the birth and demise of eras. Recognizing war as a liminal experience 
sheds light on warÕs constitutive function for politics and societies, that is, its profoundly 
productive power over the structure and substance of the international system and its discontents 
(see Barkawi and Brighton 2011). As for liminality in general, Òthe final element of warÕs 
ontology is its power to remake what is unmadeÓ (ibid.: 140). Conventional veins of social and 
political inquiry have understood war not as a generative force but rather as an interruption in the 
normal peacetime processes of society, using periodization and separation to bracket it off from 
the inevitable march toward liberal modernity. Conceiving of war as a liminal situation sui 
generis helps to avoid the tendency of most IR theoretical traditions to reduce war to terms of 
analysis derived from peacetime society, or to another social domain (cf. Barkawi 2010, 2011). 
Instead, understanding war through the lens of liminality underscores its unique nature among 
other social activities, Òits own character and logic that cannot be reduced to any ordinary social 
dynamicÓ (Shaw 1988: 11). 
Like liminality writ large, war is fundamentally a situation of uncertainty. War constitutes 
a central phase in the escalation of violence and can shake existing societal structures and 
international system to the core. The postwar process of reconstruction can, in turn, be conceived 
of as a rite of reaggregationÑthe beginning of coming to terms with the experience of a major 
collapse of the existing order, healing wounds, and moving on (Szakolczai 2000: 223). But the 
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road of transition from war to peace is hardly straightforward or fixed. The postwar phase is 
often marked by a prolonged state of juridical-political limbo (as in the case of Kosovo) that can 
result in de facto quasi-autonomous states (e.g., Transnistria in Moldova) or the separatist regions 
recognized by some but not most of the international community (e.g., the dubious status of 
North Ossetia and Abkhazia after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008). 
The American cultural historian Paul Fussell (2000) has provided a remarkable account 
of war as a liminal experience of its own kind.8 Besides the strikingly spatial liminal character of 
World War I trench warfare, that is, the distinct liminality of no-manÕs-land, Fussell points to an 
interesting pattern in the war-fighting practice and thought processes of the soldiers in World War 
I. There were three separate lines of trenches in the Great WarÑfront, support, and reserveÑand 
a battalion normally spent a third of its duty time in each. The routine in each line was similar: 
the unit was divided into three groups, two of which stood down while the third kept alert. 
Universally applicable everywhere from artillery to submarines, the daily pattern of participating 
in this tripartite way of dividing things for an extended period inevitably contributed to the 
tendency to see Òeverything as divisible as threesÓ (ibid.: 125). The magical threes of traditional 
myth and ritual further donated some of their meanings and implications to Òmilitary threes.Ó As 
a result, the military triad took on a mythical or prophetic character that elevated military action 
to the level of myth (ibid.). This course is further supported by the essentially threefold 
conception of the military training process: first preparation, then execution, and finally critique. 
War memoirs replicate this process accordingly, matching the war experience of moving between 
the line, battle, and recovery to the existential dimensions of quest, death, and rebirth (ibid.: 130Ð
31). 
Being quite clearly distinguishable and therefore largely symmetrical with the tripartite 
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structure of ritual processes as described by the anthropologists quoted above, these three zones 
of war were characteristic of the so-called traditional, or conventional, wars of the twentieth 
century. The Cold War, with its recurring rupture points between war and peace, and todayÕs 
asymmetrical, protracted conflicts, such as the current Western war in Afghanistan, vividly 
illustrate the idea of permanent liminalityÑa prolonged condition of being stuck in the in-
between zone of war and peace. Western soldiers fighting the Taliban and al-QaedaÑand 
perhaps equally so vice versaÑfind that the nature of contemporary conflict forces them to face 
the condition of ultimate, protracted liminality: they live in a perpetual potential war zone, in 
persisting tension that could burst into a life-endangering confrontation any given moment. 
Moreover, modern-day terrorism leaves us with hardly any ÒreservesÓ in the traditional sense of 
the term, as any civilian could find her- or himself at the hottest ÒfrontÓ of the conflict if caught 
in the midst of a suicide bomberÕs attack. Modern international conflict has turned the condition 
of perpetual liminality into a universal experience.9 
The cyber component of modern conflicts further illuminates the liminal nature of 
contemporary warfare. Following Turner by understanding liminality as essentially 
becomingness, we could regard the virtual space of waging war as liminal par excellence. Slavoj 
Žižek (2003: 9) has addressed Gilles DeleuzeÕs notion of the virtual as Òpure becoming without 
being,Ó which is Òalways forthcoming and already pastÓ (Deleuze 1990: 80) but never present or 
corporeal. The virtual is a liminal space constituted only by its state of becomingness; it is not an 
actual being or object to become. It exists as pure becoming that suspends both Òsequentiality 
and directionality,Ó being a passage without a concrete line of passage (Žižek 2003: 9-10). 
Standard IR approaches, as Der DerianÕs work (2009: 255) has evocatively shown, are not 
equipped to explore the Òinterzone of the virtual, where simulacra reverse causality, being is 
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simultaneously here and there, and identity is deterritorialised by interconnectivity.Ó In this 
context, it is hardly surprising that modern security organizations like NATO are struggling so 
hard to accommodate cyber attacks within the traditional framework of understanding an Òarmed 
attack,Ó and to determine whether this type of warfare could also invoke the collective defense 
provision of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a legitimate case for the use of force. 
Cyber warfare is by definition a liminal activity: it is difficult to track down, has no clear 
entrance or exit points, and last but not least may be a transition to or a phase accompanying full 
standard warfare. 
Regardless of the ÒnewÓ or ÒoldÓ nature of contemporary wars, the concept of liminality 
holds obvious analytical purchase for the reinterpretation of major crises such as political 
revolutions, or for studying warÕs impact on the rise of the modern world by considering its 
institutional structure as being essentially the product of liminal crises (Szakolczai 2008b: 278). 
 
<HDA>The Return of Play to the Scholarship and Practice of International Politics 
Raising liminalityÕs status as an epistemological category for the study of international politics is 
a critical move with fundamental implications for responsible scholarship and ethical practice of 
international relations. The ubiquity of liminal situations and phenomena in international politics, 
which this chapter has aimed to illuminate, calls for recognizing, rather than negating and 
suppressing, ambivalence as a constant fluctuation between different ways of being. The concept 
of liminality acknowledges the complexity of ambivalent situations, allowing for improved 
analysis of the modalities of various kinds of conflicts by genealogically tracing their conditions 
of emergence. Because liminality embraces difference without assuming or imposing hierarchy, 
it has clear normative appeal for transcending the Òproblem of differenceÓ that allegedly 
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pervades international society as a tendency to interpret difference as inferiority, destining it 
thereby to eradication (Inayatullah and Blaney 2006). 
It would only be empirically relevant and normatively rewarding to view international 
politics as a Ògiant fugue of interweaving themes and voices, of subject and replyÓ (cf. Symes 
2006: 317). The notion of liminality calls for recognizing an entire constellation of different 
ÒvoicesÓ of international political reality, and for reading them contrapuntally, as always 
engaging with each other. As outlined by Edward Said, the contrapuntal approach envisions 
cultures not as pure, distinct, monolithic beings, but as largely overlapping and interdependent 
entities in which patterns of power and domination are always accompanied by resistance and 
subversion, thus constituting a flow of points and counterpoints (ibid.). In a similar spirit, world 
politics could be regarded as made of processes and crossings rather than clearly distinguishable 
blocs; as a combination of fragile and mixed identities, of different figures inhabiting different 
edges of the international reality, of ambiguities, frustrations, and uncertainties. Instead of 
attempting to draw rigid boundaries (and be thus destined to continually police them) in order to 
represent international reality as made up of distinct entities and structures, we would benefit 
epistemologically by recognizing the pervasiveness of liminality in international political life. 
Bringing liminality to the conceptual center of IR strongly resonates with Naeem 
Inayatullah and David BlaneyÕs suggestion to revise and redesign IR as a theory of intercultural 
relations, or the study of differences (2006: 17). Traditional IRÕs inability to make a unique 
contribution to social theory has arguably stemmed from its persistent avoidance and denial of 
the problem of how to handle cultural difference. Accordingly, traditional IR theory shares the 
spirit of modernization theory, which attempts to establish human commonality, or universality, 
by employing two binaries: the spatial demarcation of inside/outside, and a developmental 
 335 
sequence from tradition to modernity (ibid.: 94Ð97). The potentiality that liminality is loaded 
with, however, is a powerful celebration of the claim that cultural difference offers not merely 
problems but also opportunities. Conceiving of human existence primarily as potentiality, or 
possibility, opens up the space of extended movement for subaltern agencies, recognizing their 
transformative capacity. Furthermore, dialogue between those holding different visions and 
experiences of the world can catalyze self-reflection amongst the bold and powerful of this world 
as well, leading them to introspect the ÒotherÓ within ÒthemselvesÓ (ibid.: 158). Greater 
sensitivity to the numerous manifestations of liminality in international politics thus also enables 
greater awareness of our own selves and our own frames of thinking and interpretation. As in 
music, where the counterpoint marks a supplementary melody as distinct from the main theme, 
applying a contrapuntal approach in IR scholarship would essentially mean writing against the 
mainstream. Bringing liminality to the disciplineÕs conceptual center could turn out to be 
empowering for exploration of previously unsought avenues of thought, as the study of liminal 
conditions in international politics brings the examination of potentiality to the fore of the study 
of international actuality (cf. Edkins 2007: 77). 
The fact that liminality is full of potency and potentiality, as well as creativity, 
experiment, and play, has major implications for the scholarship and practice of IR. It calls for 
polyvocality in both the politics and scholarship of IR, for indeed: 
<EXT> 
There may be a play of ideas, a play of words, a play of symbols, a play of metaphors. In 
it, playÕs the thing. Liminality is not confined in its expression to ritual and the 
performative arts. Scientific hypotheses and experiments and philosophical speculation 
are also forms of play, though their rules and controls are more rigorous and their relation 
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to mundane ÒindicativeÓ reality more pointed than those of genres which proliferate in 
fantasy. One might say, without too much exaggeration, that liminal phenomena are at the 
level of culture what variability is at the level of nature. (Turner 1979: 466) 
<FL>Hence a normatively exemplary IR scholarship could function as a special kind of a 
liminal-like or liminoid genre aimed at exposing the injustices, inefficiencies, immoralities, and 
alienations generated by mainstream modern economic and political structures, processes, and 
ways of thinking about them (ibid.: 494). As a discipline, IR has innate potential to become a 
critical practice of a very special kind, always aiming to provide clear-headed, engaged analysis 
of the established order of international politics. 
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1. For the application of the notion of liminality to the study of liminal experiences of societies 
writ large, see Eisenstadt (1995); Szakolczai (2000, 2003, 2008a); Wydra (2001); Norton (1988). 
In IR, the concept of liminality has been put to use in different empirical contexts by Neumann 
(1999, 2012); Rumelili (2003, 2012); Morozov and Rumelili (2012); Kuus (2007); Mlksoo 
(2009, 2010, 2012); Stoicescu (2012). 
2. Along with many poststructuralists in IR, anthropologist Abner Cohen (1969) has vividly 
demonstrated the significance of boundary maintenance in the development of political 
distinctiveness. 
3. Cf. Walter BenjaminÕs work on passages and his idea of nonlinear time in The Arcades Project 
(1999). 
4. Cf. LebowÕs (2012) captivating account of the initial psychological state of the German 
scholars who emigrated in the United States in the 1930s. 
5. This problem is further analyzed in the context of the contemporary Òmemory warsÓ between 
Russia and its former satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe in Mlksoo (2012). 
6. Arpd Szakolczai (2000: 223) has described Soviet communism as a specific kind of 
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permanent liminality, as under this regime Òthe Second World War never ended.Ó 
7. Turner often pointed to liminality as an Òoriginal stateÓ of a kind, the formless reality out of 
which new forms emerge, the zone of new beginnings. He touched on the crux of the matter in 
his famous essay ÒBetwixt and BetweenÓ (1967: 97) as follows: ÒLiminality may perhaps be 
regarded as the Nay to all positive structural assertions, but as in some sense the source of them 
all, and, more than that, as a realm of pure possibility whence novel configurations of ideas and 
relations may arise.Ó 
8. I am grateful to Prof. Richard Ned Lebow for pointing me toward FussellÕs work. 
9. Drone warfare is yet another example of doing away with the traditional boundaries between 
war and peace, as the populations under the surveillance and potential attacks of drones live in a 
zone of constant possibility of being killed. See further Ansorge (2012) and Gregory (2012). 
